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As signals of internal control weaknesses, cyber security incidents can represent significant 
risk factors to the quality of financial reporting. We empirically assess the audit quality 
implications of data breaches for a large sample of US firms. Using a difference-in-difference 
approach based on a matched sample of breached and non-breached firms, we find no evidence 
that cyber-security incidents result in a decline in audit quality. Instead, we observe positive 
shifts in four widely-used proxies for audit quality. We document that breached firms (i) 
experience a decrease in abnormal accruals, (ii) are less likely to report small profits or small 
earnings increases, (iii) are more likely to be issued a going concern report, and (iv) are less 
likely to restate their financial statements in the two years following a breach. Our results 
indicate that auditors effectively offset increases in audit risk through additional substantive 
testing and audit effort. Our evidence supports the view that auditors have increased their audit 
risk awareness and put in place adequate procedures to deal with the consequences of cyber-
security incidents. 
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Accounting scandals at large publicly traded firms such as Enron and Worldcom, the demise 
of Arthur Andersen, and the passage of the Sarbanes-Oxley Act (SOX) of 2002 have increased 
the publics’ and auditors’ sensitivity to the risk of material errors and irregularities in financial 
statements. In this paper, we assess the implications of cyber-security incidents for audit 
quality. Existing research on how external auditors respond to cyber-security risks is limited 
and in particular questions concerning the impact on the quality of financial reporting remain 
unanswered. Cyber-security incidents are understood as signals for internal control weaknesses 
(Chernobai, Jorion, and Yu, 2011; Benaroch, Chernobai, and Goldstein, 2012; Benaroch and 
Chernobai, 2017) and, as such, can present significant risk factors to the quality of financial 
reporting (Hogan and Wilkins, 2008; Lawrence and Minutti-Meza and Vyas, 2018). 
The number of cyber-security incidents is growing every year as a result of the increasing use 
of the Internet, mobile applications, and technologies such as cloud computing (Romanosky, 
Hoffman, and Acquisti, 2014; Abbasi, Sarker, and Chiang, 2016). Cyber-security incidents can 
result in significant damage to breached firms in terms of remediation costs, fines, and 
reputation (Cavusoglu, Mishra, and Raghunathan, 2004; Gordon, Loeb, and Zhou, 2011; 
Rosati, Deeney, Cummins, Van der Werff, and Lynn, 2019a). According to recent reports on 
cyber-security, more than 20 percent of firms that experience a security breach report a 
substantial loss of revenue, a reduction in their customer base, and lose out on business 
opportunities, with total costs amounting to approximately USD17 million per firm (CISCO 
2017; Ponemon Institute 2016). 
Firms establish internal control systems to provide reasonable assurance of reaching objectives 
in relation to operational effectiveness and efficiency, reliable financial reporting, and 
compliance with law and regulations (COSO, 2004). A cyber-security incident might directly 
affect and compromise the internal controls over financial reporting (ICFR) of the affected 
firm. In this case, firm’s books and records may be altered, which could  result in manipulations 
of the financial statements. This issue has recently been reiterated by regulators like the Public 
Company Accounting Oversight Board (PCAOB). The PCAOB specifically cautions external 
auditors to consider how cyber incidents may affect a firm’s ICFR (PCAOB 2010, 2013). 
However, given the integrated nature of firm’s internal control systems, cyber-security 
incidents can also pose threats to audit quality through their effect on operational control risk, 
or in particular, information technology (IT) controls. Because operating and financial 
reporting activities rely on shared controls, a weakness in one area is likely to affect the other 
(Lawrence et al., 2018). Internal control weaknesses (Doyle, Ge, and McVay, 2007b; 
Ashbaugh-Skaife, Collins, Kinney, and LaFond, 2008), and IT control weaknesses in particular 
(Masli, Peters, Richardson, and Sanchez, 2010; Haislip, Masli, Richardson, and Sanchez, 2016; 
Messier, Eilifsen, and Austen, 2004; Klamm and Watson, 2009), can carry significant negative 
implications for financial reporting quality. 
Recent research suggests that auditors respond to cyber-security incidents by increasing audit 
effort and charging higher audit fees to their clients (Li, No, and Boritz, 2016; Lawrence et al., 
2018; Rosati, Gogolin, and Lynn, 2019b). There is also some evidence suggesting that cyber-
security breaches can result in a higher likelihood of financial restatements in the year of the 
breach (Lawrence et al., 2018). 
Our paper builds on this nascent stream of academic research and aims to provide additional 
insights in regard to the implications of cyber-security incidents for the quality of financial 
reporting. The aim of this paper is to provide a comprehensive empirical assessment of the 
change in audit quality around cyber-security events. We argue that, while internal control 
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weaknesses certainly increase audit risk, they may not necessarily result in a decrease in audit 
quality. For example, in the presence of internal control deficiencies, as inherent and control 
risks increase, auditors may increase their substantive testing to uphold the quality of the audit 
(Hogan and Wilkins, 2008). In line with this argument, previous research has identified an 
increase in audit fees as the result of cyber-security incidents (Li et al., 2016; Rosati et al., 
2019b). To the extent, that audit fees serve as a proxy for audit effort (Whisenant, 
Sankaraguruswamy, and Raghunandan, 2003; Blankley, Hurtt, and MacGregor, 2012), the 
results imply that auditors, in the presence of cyber-security incidents, increase their audit 
effort to maintain an acceptable level of audit risk. The main argument of this paper is that if 
auditors increase their audit effort and substantive testing sufficiently, cyber-security incidents 
should not result in a reduction in audit quality. 
We examine this assertion using a sample of 329 cyber-security incidents, affecting US listed 
companies, from 2005 to 2014, reported by Privacy Rights Clearinghouse (PRC). We limit our 
sample to firms audited by Big 4 auditors to ensure comparable levels of audit quality (Blankley 
et al., 2012; Rosati et al., 2019b), and match breached firms to non-breached firms operating 
within the same industry and with the nearest firm size (total assets). Throughout our analysis 
we adopt a difference-in-difference (DID) model design with year and industry fixed effects as 
per Rosati et al. (2019b), Khurana, Lundstrom, and Raman (2020), and Yu, Kwak, Park, and 
Zhang (2020), which allows us to assess the change in audit quality resulting from a cyber-
security incident while also taking into account the staggered nature of these events. To assess 
the impact of cyber-security incidents on the quality of financial reporting, we examine a 
number of well-established proxies for audit quality, namely (i) the level of abnormal accruals, 
(ii) earnings benchmarks, (iii) the likelihood of issuing going-concern opinions, and (iv) the 
likelihood of financial restatements. 
We find no evidence of a significant decrease in audit quality in the two years following a 
breach. This is an important finding because it supports the view that, despite being a 
significant risk factor, cyber-security breaches do not result in financial reporting deficiencies 
or audit failure. Instead, we document a significant and positive association between our 
measures of audit quality and cyber-security. We rationalise this result as a manifestation of 
the dynamic described by Li et al. (2016) and Rosati et al. (2019b). The authors observe an 
increase in audit fees as a function of increasing audit risk and audit effort. Following their 
rationale, we argue that the increased audit effort ultimately results in a positive post-incident 
effect (Li et al., 2016; Lawrence et al., 2018; Rosati et al., 2019b). 
We also provide some analysis regarding one possible channel of transmission. Using SEC 
Comment Letters as proxies for regulator interest (Cassell, Dreher, and Myers, 2013), we show 
that breached firms are more likely to receive SEC Comment Letters and IT-related SEC 
Comment Letters following a cyber-security incident than non-breached firms. Indeed, 
regulatory scrutiny over clients can be a further incentive for auditors to increase their effort 
(Donohoe and Knechel, 2012; Bell, Causholli, and Knechel, 2015). As such, we argue that the 
increase in audit quality may be partially driven by pressures exerted from regulators, to which 
the auditor responds by increasing audit effort. 
This study contributes to the growing literature on the impact and consequences of cyber-
security incidents for external auditors and firms. First, this study specifically addresses the 
issue of audit quality, while previous related studies (Li et al., 2016; Lawrence et al., 2018; 
Rosati et al., 2019b) mostly focus on audit fees. Second, as opposed to previous studies that 
focus on a single audit quality indicator (Lawrence et al., 2018), we adopt a number of different 
proxies for audit quality to provide a more comprehensive assessment. Specifically, we 
examine the impact of cyber-security incidents on abnormal accruals, earnings benchmarks, 
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the likelihood of issuing going-concern opinions, and the likelihood of financial restatements. 
Third, our study also contributes to the literature on audit risk. Even though cyber-security 
incidents result in an increase in audit risk (Li et al., 2016; Rosati et al., 2019b), they do not 
prove to be detrimental to the quality of financial reporting. Our evidence provides support for 
the idea that auditors can decrease audit risk by increasing their audit effort. We also provide 
further evidence on the importance of SEC comment letters as an instrument of regulatory 
monitoring. Fourth, we provide further evidence on the importance of addressing sample bias 
and unobserved differences in treatment and control firms. Using a propensity score matched 
sample and a difference-in-difference approach to identify potential causal relationships, we 
are able to estimate on the relationship of cyber-security events and audit quality. 
The remainder of the paper is organised as follows. In the next section, we discuss prior 
literature and present our hypothesis. This is followed by an outline of the research design and 
a description of the data used throughout this study. We then present the results, some 
robustness checks and a discussion of our empirical analysis. We conclude with some final 
remarks and avenues for future research. 
 
2. Background and Hypothesis 
2.1 Cyber-security incidents 
The number of cyber-security incidents is growing every year particularly due to the increasing 
use of the Internet, cloud computing, and mobile devices (Romanosky et al., 2014; Abbasi et 
al., 2016). Cyber-security incidents can result in significant damage to breached firms in terms 
of remediation costs, fines, and reputation (Cavusoglu et al., 2004; Gordon et al., 2011; Rosati 
et al., 2019a). Cyber-security incidents are complex and multifaceted events and their full 
implications may not always materialise immediately. For example, Equifax, a credit-reporting 
agency, admitted on 7 September 2017, that hackers had compromised information of over 140 
million individuals between May and July of the same year (Bernard, Hsu, Perlroth, and Lieber, 
2017). Hackers were able to exploit a vulnerability of their website and gained access to social 
security numbers, dates of birth, driving licence numbers and credit card information. The 
consequences of the breach were considerable. The firm’s stock price dropped approximately 
18 percent upon first disclosure of the breach (Volz and Shepardson, 2017); court documents 
filed in the settlement of the case suggest that the minimum cost would be USD1.38 billion 
(Jaeger, 2020).  
A number of empirical studies demonstrate that cyber-security incidents typically result in a 
loss in market value for the affected firms (Campbell, Gordon, Loeb, and Zhou, 2003; 
Cavusoglu et al., 2004; Gatzlaff and McCullough, 2010; Gordon et al., 2011; Kamiya, Kang, 
Kim, Milidonis, and Stulz, 2019; Rosati et al., 2019a). In extreme cases, the decline in a firm’s 
market value can amount to 12 percent over a two-day period following the breach (Cavusoglu 
et al., 2004). In a recent study, Rosati et al. (2017) show that cyber incidents are also reflected 
in wider bid-ask spreads and abnormal trading volume. Overall, the evidence highlights the 
negative implications of cyber-security incidents (Campbell et al., 2003; Gatzlaff and 
McCullough, 2010; Gordon et al., 2011). 
Extant research has identified a variety of contingency factors that can strengthen or weaken 
the observed market response to cyber-security incidents. Yayla and Hu (2011) and Das, 
Mukhopadhyay, and Anand (2012), for example, find that e-commerce firms are more severely 
affected by security breaches. Other factors that have been found to significantly affect the 
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market response to cyber-security breaches are firm size and type, industry, media coverage 
and disclosure texts (Acquisti, Friedman, and Telang, 2006; Yayla and Hu, 2011; Berezina, 
Cobanoglu, Miller, and Kwansa 2012; Das et al., 2012; Wang, Kannan, and Ulmer, 2013; 
Rosati et al., 2019a). Moreover, it is unclear whether and how the type of breach determines 
the strength of the market reaction as demonstrated by the inconclusive empirical evidence 
provided so far by academic researchers (Goldstein, Chernobai, and Benaroch, 2011; Gordon 
et al., 2011; Benaroch et al., 2012). 
The implications of cyber-security incidents at firm- and market-level are well documented 
and articles about new breaches appear in the media on a regular basis. However, cyber-
security incidents also affect a number of other stakeholders (Hovav and Gray, 2014). External 
auditors and regulators are particularly concerned about cyber-security incidents affecting 
firms under their supervision. Yet, this issue remains little explored in the literature. 
2.2 Internal control weaknesses 
Internal control is defined broadly as a process designed to provide reasonable assurance about 
the attainment of organisational objectives (COSO, 2013). An organisation establishes a 
system of internal control policies and procedures in response to the potential occurrence of 
events it has identified as posing a risk to its objectives (COSO, 2004). In this context, the 
occurrence of an adverse event would highlight a weakness in the internal control system, 
either because controls are missing or  because they are deficient. 
As a response to the large and high-profile accounting scandals that led to the implementation 
of SOX in 2002, the attention of regulators and the public on financial reporting risks has 
increased dramatically over the last decades. However, the breadth of internal controls spans 
beyond financial reporting as it also includes operations and regulatory compliance. As such, 
a firm’s internal control system affects operational efficiency and effectiveness as well as 
financial reporting accuracy (Klamm and Watson, 2009). In this context, the impact of cyber-
security incidents on the quality of financial reporting can be direct and indirect. Cyber-security 
risks can materialise in the form of so called “more-than-reporting” control weaknesses (Feng, 
McVay, and Skaife, 2014), such as IT control weaknesses or “financial reporting-only” 
weaknesses (Hogan and Wilkins, 2008). 
The PCAOB suggests that external auditors are expected to consider how cyber-security events 
may affect a firm’s internal control over financial reporting (ICFR). ICFR are designed “to 
provide reasonable assurance regarding the reliability of financial reporting and the preparation 
of financial statements for external purposes in accordance with generally accepted accounting 
principles” (PCAOB, 2014). It also considers procedures related to maintaining records, the 
documentation of transactions, authorisation of receipts and the safeguarding of assets (Hogan 
and Wilkins, 2008). Furthermore, Section 404 of SOX explicitly requires auditors to attest and 
report on the effectiveness of a client’s ICFR. Prior research has linked cyber-security incidents 
to potential internal control weaknesses (Lawrence et al., 2018), and ICFR weaknesses to 
financial reporting deficiencies (e.g. Doyle, Ge, and McVay, 2007a; Ashbaugh-Skaife et al., 
2008). It is thus clear, that in the event of a cyber-security incident that directly involves the 
firm’s accounting systems, the auditor must carefully consider the risk of manipulation and the 
potential impact on financial statements (PCAOB, 2014). 
However, cyber-security could also indirectly affect audit quality through their impact on a 
firm’s operational controls. Control platforms such as system software, firm-level controls, and 
access controls, support entity-wide operating and control functions (IFAC, 2010). As such, it 
is not surprising that operational controls and financial reporting activities are heavily 
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integrated and rely on shared controls. This implies that weak operational controls likely pose 
a risk for financial reporting quality. In relation to cyber-security incidents, information 
technology (IT) controls are particularly relevant. Prior research shows that investments in IT 
can help automate processes and as a result reduce misstatements (Messier et al., 2004). 
However, different IT systems are now heavily integrated within the firm and through the 
Internet. As such, they also create additional risks if adequate IT controls are not in place which 
may ultimately result in material misstatements (Klamm and Watson, 2009). 
Recent research finds that cyber-security incidents lead to a contemporaneous increase in audit 
fees (Li et al., 2016; Lawrence et al., 2018; Rosati et al., 2019b). Rosati et al. (2019b), for 
example, find that firms that experience a breach are charged 28 percent higher audit fees 
compared to non-breached firms in the year of a cyber-security incident. This increase is 
interpreted as a response to an increase in audit risk and audit effort. While the direction of the 
hypothesised impact of cyber-security events on audit risk is relatively clear (Li et al., 2016; 
Lawrence et al., 2018; Rosati et al., 2019b), the direction and effect on audit quality is not. The 
central argument of this paper is that, while cyber-security incidents may not necessarily be 
due to reporting deficiencies, they could be interpreted as a signals of potential control 
weaknesses (Benaroch and Chernobai, 2017), which would ultimately increase audit risk. 
When audit risk increases, auditors will increase their substantive testing to uphold the quality 
of the audit1  (Hogan and Wilkins, 2008). As a result, if auditors perceive cyber-security 
incidents as signals of potential control weaknesses, they would increase their audit effort, and 
this would ultimately result in an increase in audit quality. Our research hypothesis is stated as 
follows: 
Hypothesis: Breached firms experience an increase in audit quality following a 
cyber-security incident. 
 
3. Research Methodology 
3.1 Research Design 
Cyber-security incidents may indicate potential internal control weaknesses (Chernobai et al., 
2011; Benaroch et al., 2012). As such, they can trigger an increase in external monitoring, in 
particular from auditors (Doyle et al., 2007a; Hogan and Wilkins, 2008). In our analysis, we 
explore changes in audit quality in response to cyber-security incidents. Specifically, we 
consider four different measures for audit quality: (i) the level of abnormal accruals (Francis 
and Yu, 2009), (ii) earnings benchmarks (Francis and Yu, 2009), (iii) the likelihood of issuing 
going-concern opinions (Francis and Yu, 2009), and (iv) the likelihood of financial 
restatements (Blankley et al., 2012). 
In order to test whether a significant difference between breached (treatment sample) and non-
breached firms (control sample) exists before and/or after a cyber-security incident, we adopt 
a difference-in-difference (DID) approach in all our regression models (Lechner, 2011). The 
DID technique has been widely used in accounting studies (e.g. Cheng and Farber, 2008; 
Wang, 2010; Li et al., 2016; Zhang and Yu, 2016; Johnstone and Petacchi, 2017; Rosati et al., 
2019b). DID is able to control for random causes of changes in the dependent variable over 
time while addressing heteroscedasticity and auto-correlation (Knechel and Sharma, 2012). As 
such, it is a powerful methodology to estimate causal relationships and to circumvent many 
endogeneity problems that can arise when comparing heterogeneous individuals or 
 
1 This point may be particularly relevant for Big4 auditors as they are assumed to possess a higher level of expertise (Haislip et al., 2016) and 
are associated with higher quality audits (DeAngelo, 1981). 
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organisations (Bertrand, Duflo, and Mullainathan, 2004; Johnston and Petacchi, 2017). We 
also included industry and year fixed-effects in all our models to take into account the staggered 
nature of cyber security incidents (Rosati et al., 2019b; Khurana et al., 2020; Yu et al., 2020). 
The effect of a cyber-security incident may span over a number of years following an incident, 
we limit our analysis to a two years pre- and post-incident as per Rosati et al. (2019b). Because 
we are interested in the changes in financial reporting quality as a result of a cyber-security 
incident, we compare the value of our proxies for audit quality in the two years prior to the 
breach (-2; -1) and the two years following the breach (+1; +2). Rosati et al. (2019b) suggest 
that the year of a cyber-security incident is exceptional for the affected firm. In such events, 
the firm must deal with an immediate and critical situation with a potential increase in current 
and future costs. Similarly, the external auditor must increase the audit effort to ensure that the 
additional costs are properly recorded and that the reliability of the financial records are not 
impacted by the breach. In this context, the exclusion of the year of the breach (t=0) provides 
a cleaner empirical setting to examine changes in audit quality. Figure 1 provides a graphical 
representation of the timeline adopted in our analysis. 
Insert Figure 1 here 
3.2 Dependent Variables 
3.2.1 Accruals Quality 
Discretionary accruals are widely used to provide evidence of earnings management which is 
interpreted as a sign of lower audit quality (Francis and Yu, 2009). We used the following 
ordinary least-squares (OLS) regression model to estimate the discretionary component of 
accruals using the performance-adjusted Modified Jones model (Kothari, Leone, and Wasley, 
2005). The model is estimated by fiscal year, two-digit industry (SIC code) while controlling 
for concurrent firm performance. The model takes the following form: 
	"#!,# = %$ + %%∆()*!,# + %&++)!,# + %',-!,# + .!,# (1) 
The variables in the model are defined as follows: TA is total accruals; ΔREV is the change in 
revenues between year t-1 and year t; PPE is gross property, plant, and equipment; and NI is 
operating income after depreciation. All variables are deflated by lagged total assets. The 
absolute value of the residuals (ε) from Equation (1) provides a measure of discretionary 
accruals following the rationale that individual firms may have incentives to engage in income-
increasing or -decreasing earnings management (Warfield, Wild, and Wild, 1995)2. We use the 
absolute value of the residual as the dependent variable in the regression model presented in 
Equation (3). 
As estimates, discretionary accruals are based on assumptions underlying the estimated model. 
In order to make sure that our results are not driven by the estimation bias of the selected model, 
we also estimate discretionary accruals using the Dechow and Dichev (2002) model. This 
model accounts for past (t-1), current (t) and future (t+1) cash flows. The model is specified as 
follows: 
"#!,# = %$ + %%∆()*!,# + %&++)!,# + %'/01!,#(% + %)/01!,# + %*/01!,#+% + .!,# (2) 
where CFO is the cash flow from operation while all other variables are as previously specified 
 
2 Becker, DeFond, Jiambalvo, and Subramanyam (1998) point out that auditors are more concerned about income-increasing rather than 
income-decreasing accruals since auditors are more likely to be sued for allegedly allowing overstated earnings. Therefore, we also considered 
“signed” accruals as an additional analysis and results are consistent. 
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in Equation (1). The absolute value of the residuals (ε) in Equation (2) provides the second 
measure of discretionary accruals and represents the dependent variable the regression model 
presented in Equation (3). 
We combine the model proposed by Francis and Yu (2009)3 with the staggered DID design 
adopted by Rosati et al. (2019b) to test whether accruals quality differs across breached and 
non-breached firms subsequent to a cyber-security incident: 
#23_#//!,# = %$ + %%2()#/5)6! + %&+13"!,# + %'2()#/5)6 × +13"!,#
+ %)283_3)9!,# + %*9)1_3)9!,# + %,:"#!,# + %-3#:)39(1;"5!,#
+ %.3#:)39(1;"5_*1:!,# + %//01!,# + %%$/01_*1:!,#
+ %%%<#";)#=!,# + %%&:)*!,# + %%':133!,# + %%)2#,=(8+"/>!,#
+ %%*<"2!,# + %	-?@ABCDE	-?@FGHCIDB + %	>JHD	-?@FGHCIDB + .!,# 
(3) 
where: 
ABS_ACC = the absolute value of the discretionary accruals estimated through 
the Modified Jones Model (ABS_ACC_JM) or through the 
Dechow-Dichev Model (ABS_ACC_DD) 
BREACHED = indicator variable equal to 1 if a firm belongs to the treatment 
group (i.e. breached), 0 otherwise; 
POST = indicator variable equal to 1 if the period is one or two years after 
a breach (t+1 or t+2), 0 otherwise; 
BREACHED x POST = interaction between BREACHED and POST (DID Estimator); 
BUS_SEG = number of business segments; 
GEO_SEG = number of geographic segments; 
LTA = natural logarithm end of year total assets; 
SALESGROWTH = one-year growth rate in sales; 
SALESGROWTH_VOL = standard deviation of sales for the most recent three fiscal years; 
CFO = operating cash flows; 
CFO_VOL = standard deviation of cash flows for the most recent three fiscal 
years; 
MATWEAK = indicator variable equal to 1 if a firm receives a material 
weakness opinion in the current or in the following year4 , 0 
otherwise; 
LEV = total debt divided by total assets; 
LOSS = indicator variable equal to 1 if the income before extraordinary 
items is lower than zero, 0 otherwise; 
BANKRUPTCY = Altman (2000) Z-Score; 
MTB = Market to book ratio; 
Industry Indicators = industry indicators based on two-digit SIC codes; 
Year Indicators = year indicators; 
ε = error term. 
As outlined in Wooldridge (2010), the treatment dummy (i.e. BREACHED) captures possible 
differences in the level of accruals  between the breached (treatment group) and non-breached 
 
3 The control variables related to auditor characteristics were excluded from the model as they were outside the scope of our study. 
4 This proxy for the effectiveness of internal control is consistent with the one used by Ettredge et al. (2006), Doyle et al. (2007a) and Blankley 
et al. (2012) which are also based on a two-year window. Blankley et al. (2012, p.84) point out that a two-year approach is necessary as “there 
is a ‘sticky’ quality to internal controls so firms that received a material weakness in the future likely had weaker internal controls in the 
current year”. We also run all our regression models controlling for material weaknesses disclosed in the current year only to check the 
robustness of our results. Our conclusions were unaltered. 
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firms (control groups) before a breach occurs; the period dummy (i.e. POST) captures 
aggregate factors that may affect the level of accruals for both breached and non-breached 
firms; the DID estimator (BREACHED x POST) captures the difference between the change in 
the level of accruals pre- and post-breach for breached and non-breached firms. As an increase 
in audit quality is assumed to constrain the extent of earnings management, we expect the 
coefficient of our DID estimator (BREACHED x POST) to be negative. 
We include control variables for many different firm characteristics as suggested by Francis 
and Yu (2009). Specifically, we control for: (i) the number of business (BUS_SEG) and 
geographical segments (GEO_SEG) firms operate in, since more diversified firms are more 
difficult to audit due to their complexity (Gul and Goodwin, 2010; Kim, Liu, and Zheng, 2012); 
(ii) firm size (LTA), since larger firms are subject to stricter monitoring and have stronger 
internal controls (Richardson, Tuna, and Wu, 2002; Balsam, Krishnan, and Yang, 2003; 
Gietzmann and Pettinicchio, 2014); (iii) sales growth (SALESGROWTH) and volatility of sales 
(SALESGROWTH_VOL) as they tend to be associated with lower earnings quality (Menon and 
Williams, 2004; Hribar and Nichols, 2007); (iv) operating cash flow and its volatility as larger 
(lower) cash flow (volatility) is usually associated with higher earnings quality (Dechow, 
Sloan, and Sweeney, 1995; Doyle et al., 2007b; Hribar and Nichols, 2007); (v) the level of 
internal controls (MATWEAK) since ineffective internal controls are associated with poor 
earnings quality (Doyle et al., 2007a); (vi) debt (LEV) and financial distress (LOSS and 
BANKRUPTCY) since debt covenants and poor financial conditions represent significant 
incentives to earnings manipulation (DeFond and Jiambalvo, 1994; Dichev and Skinner, 2002; 
Jaggi and Lee, 2002); and (vii) market-to-book ratio as firms with growth opportunities may 
have higher incentives to manage earnings in order to meet market expectations (Francis and 
Yu, 2009). 
3.2.2 Earnings Benchmark 
Previous studies suggest that meeting earnings expectations is one of the main incentives for 
earnings management (Healy and Wahlen, 1999) and that an abnormally high (low) proportion 
of firms report earnings just above or below the benchmarks (Burgstahler and Dichev, 1997; 
Degeorge, Patel, and Zeckhauser, 1999). 
We combine the probit model proposed by Francis and Yu (2009) with the staggered DID 
design adopted by Rosati et al. (2019b) to test two common benchmarks: reporting small 
positive profits (avoiding losses), and reporting small positive earnings increases (avoiding 
earnings declines): 
+(12-"[2),/5<#(= = 1] = N(%$ + %%2()#/5)6! + %&+13"!,# + 
+%'2()#/5)6 × +13"!,# + %)283_3)9!,# + 
+%*9)1_3)9!,# + %,:"#!,# + 
+%-3#:)39(1;"5!,# + %.3#:)39(1;"5_*1:!,# 
+%//01!,# + %%$/01_*1:!,# + 
+%%%<#";)#=!,# + %%&:)*!,# + %%':133!,# + 
+%%)2#,=(8+"/>!,# + %%*<"2!,# + 
+%	-?@ABCDE	-?@FGHCIDB + 
+%	>JHD	-?@FGHCIDB + .!,#) 
(4) 
BENCHMARK is specified in two alternative ways: (i) an indicator variable equal to 1 if a firm 
reports a small profit (SMALL_PROFIT), and 0 otherwise; and (ii) an indicator variable equal 
to 1 if a firm reports a small earnings increase (SMALL_INCREASE), and 0 otherwise. We 
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adopt the definitions of small profit and earning increase proposed by Francis and Yu (2009). 
A firm is considered to report a small profit if its net income, deflated by lagged total assets, is 
between 0 and 5 percent, and to report a small earnings increase if the change in its net income, 
deflated by lagged total assets, is between 0 and 1.3 percent5. All other control variables are 
consistent with Francis and Yu (2009). The model is estimated using clustered robust standard 
errors to correct for heteroscedasticity and serial dependence (Rogers, 1993). 
As per the model presented in Equation (3), BREACHED, POST, and BREACHED x POST are 
the variables of interest. Firms with higher audit quality are expected to be less likely to 
consistently meet earnings benchmarks. We expect the coefficient of BREACHED x POST to 
be negative if there is an increase in audit monitoring following a cyber-security incident. 
3.2.3 Going Concern 
Previous studies demonstrate that audit quality is associated with a higher probability of 
auditors issuing a going concern report (Francis, 2004; Knechel and Vanstraelen, 2007; 
Hardies, Breesch, and Branson, 2016). 
In order to test whether the likelihood of issuing a going-concern audit report differs across 
breached and non-breached firms subsequent to a cyber-security incident, we adopt a 
combination of the probit model proposed by Francis and Yu (2009) and the staggered DID 
design adopted by Rosati et al. (2019b): 
+(12-"[9/1,/)(, = 1] = N(%$ + %%2()#/5)6! + %&+13"!,# + 
+%'2()#/5)6 × +13"!,# + %)283_3)9!,# + 
+%*9)1_3)9!,# + %,:"#!,# + 
+%-/#35!,# + %.+(-1(_9/1,/)(,!,# + 
+%/()+1("_:#9!,# + %%$:)*!,# + 
+%%%:133!,# + %%&:#9_:133!,# + 
+%%'2#,=(8+"/>!,# + %%)<"2!,# + 
+%	-?@ABCDE	-?@FGHCIDB 
+%	>JHD	-?@FGHCIDB + .!,#) 
(5) 
GCONCERN is an indicator variable equal to 1 if a client receives a going-concern audit report, 
and 0 otherwise. CASH is a liquidity measure that is the sum of the firm’s cash and investment 
securities, scaled by total assets. A firm with more liquid assets should be better able to deal 
with financial difficulties. Therefore CASH is expected to be negatively associated with the 
probability of a going-concern opinion (Francis and Yu, 2009). PRIOR_GCONCERN is an 
indicator variable equal to 1 if a firm received a going- concern opinion in the previous fiscal 
year as firms are more likely to receive a going-concern report if they received a prior-year 
going-concern qualification (Reynolds and Francis, 2000). REPORT_LAG measures the 
number of days between the fiscal year-end and the earnings announcement date as previous 
studies provide evidence of going-concern opinions being associated with longer reporting 
delays (Raghunandan and Rama, 1995; Carcello, Hermanson, and Huss, 1995; DeFond, 
Raghunandan, and Subramanyam, 2002). LAG_LOSS is an indicator variable equal to 1 if a 
firm reported a loss in the previous fiscal year, and 0 otherwise. All other control variables 
follow Francis and Yu (2009). As per the previous models, we estimate the regression 
coefficients using clustered robust standard errors to correct for heteroscedasticity and serial 
 
5 We also test our results using different thresholds i.e. 2 percent for small profit (Frankel, Johnson, and Nelson, 2002; Carey and Simnett, 
2006), and between 1 and 2 percent for small earning increase (Frankel et al., 2002; Ashbaugh, LaFond, and Mayhew, 2003; Carey and 
Simnett, 2006). Our results are robust to these alternative specifications. 
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dependence (Rogers, 1993). 
Given that firms with higher audit quality are expected to be more likely to receive a going 
concern report, we expect BREACHED x POST to have a positive coefficient. 
3.2.4 Restatement 
A restatement indicates low-quality financial reporting due to the incorrect application of 
accounting principles and is a strong indicator of low audit quality (Kinney, Palmrose, and 
Scholz, 2004; Francis, 2011; Eshleman and Guo, 2014). 
We test whether the likelihood of disclosing a restatement differs across breached and non-
breached firms following a cyber-security incident. We use the following probit model similar 
to the one adopted by Blankley et al. (2012) and combine it with the staggered DID design 
adopted by Rosati et al. (2019b): 
+(12-"[()3"#") = 1] = N(%$ + %%2()#/5)6! + %&+13"!,# + 
+%'2()#/5)6 × +13"!,# + %):"#!,# + %*:)*!,# + 
+%,<"2!,# + %-0-,!,# + %.)+39(1;!,# + 
+%/)+(!,# + %%$/01!,# + %%%<#";)#=!,# + 
+%%&#2#0))3!,# + %	-?@ABCDE	-?@FGHCIDB + 
+%	>JHD	-?@FGHCIDB + .!,#) 
(6) 
RESTATE is an indicator variable equal to 1 if a firm restates its financial statements within a 
two-year period (t+1 or t+2) and 0 otherwise as per Blankely et al. (2012)6. Capital markets 
can generate incentives for aggressive accounting practices (Healy and Wahlen, 1999), hence 
we control for two market-related factors that are associated with restatements, namely growth 
expectations, measured as earnings-to-price ratio (EPR) and market-to-book ratio (MTB), and 
demand for external financing, measured as the sum of additional cash raised from issuance of 
long-term debt, common stock and preferred stock scaled by total assets (FIN) and cash-flow 
from operations (CFO) (Richardson et al., 2002). We also include a control variable 
(EPSGROW) for the pressure of maintaining a positive earnings trend since such a pressure 
might represent an incentive to earnings manipulation (Myers, Myers, and Skinner, 2007). 
Finally, we include control variables for the level of internal controls (MATWEAK) and audit 
effort, measured as abnormal audit fees (ABAFEES)7. Both variables are included because 
previous research has linked ineffective internal control (Feldmann, Read, and 
Abdolmohammadi, 2009) and low audit effort to the likelihood of a firm to restate (Blankley 
et al., 2012). All other control variables are as per Blankley et al. (2012). We adopt clustered 
robust standard errors to correct for heteroscedasticity and serial dependence (Rogers, 1993). 
Stricter audit monitoring typically leads to higher audit quality, which should ultimately result 
in a lower probability of restatement (Blankley et al., 2012). Hence, we expect the coefficient 
of BREACHED x POST to have a negative coefficient if breached firms experience an increase 
 
6 A restatement is the alteration of previously audited financial statements due to errors, frauds or other causes (Stanley and DeZoort, 2007). 
As such, it represents a late manifestation of poor audit quality as errors or misreporting in the financial statement were not detected during 
the initial audit.  
7 We use the model suggested by Blankley et al. (2012) to estimate abnormal audit fees. In the model, the dependent variable is the natural 
logarithm of audit fees and the results suggest that larger (LTA), riskier (CR, CA_TA, LOSS, LEV, INTANG MATWEAK), and more 
complex (FOREIGN, SEG, MERGER) firms pay higher audit fees, while more profitable firms (ROA), and firms whose fiscal year end on 
December 31st pay lower audit fees. These results are consistent with Blankley et al. (2012) and with prior literature on audit fees which 
suggests that audit fees depend on auditee’s size, complexity, risk, financial condition and internal controls (Simunic, 1980; Craswell, Francis, 
and Taylor, 1995; Gul and Goodwin, 2010; Gietzmann and Pettinicchio, 2014; Han, Rezaee, Xue, and Zhang, 2016; Rosati et al. 2019b). The 
regression results are reported in Appendix B.  
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in audit quality following a cyber-security incident. 
3.3 Sample Selection 
Our sample is based on all cyber-security incidents reported by Privacy Rights Clearinghouse 
(PRC) from 2005 to 2014. PRC is a California based non-profit corporation that aims to 
identify trends in privacy protection and communicate its findings to advocates, policymakers, 
industry, media and consumers. PRC also maintains detailed information about cyber security 
incidents in the US. Information about the incidents is collected through either government 
agencies or verifiable media sources. Even though the list cannot be considered exhaustive 
because “many organisations are not aware they have been breached or are not required to 
report it based on reporting laws” (PRC, 2017), previous studies have demonstrated its value 
for academic research (Garrison and Ncube, 2011; Higgs, Pinsker, Smith, and Young, 2016; 
Li et al., 2016; Rosati et al., 2017, 2019a, 2019b). Furthermore, the widespread adoption of 
Security Breach Notification Laws (SNBLs)8 across different states, their increasing disclosure 
requirements, and the fact that PRC gathers information from multiple information sources, 
mitigates the potential sampling bias. 
This dataset contains 4,041 cyber-security incidents disclosed by firms, non-profit 
organisations, healthcare organisations and government agencies in the US from April 2005 to 
December 2014. We restrict our sample to incidents that affect publicly traded firms. Further, 
we excluded financial firms (SIC Codes 6000-6999) due the different nature of their financial 
statements9, and firms audited by auditors other than the Big4 in order to ensure relative 
homogeneity in audit quality (Blankley et al., 2012). Finally, in order to avoid the influence of 
previous incidents, we include only the first cyber-security breach for each firm in our sample. 
The final sample (hereafter also referred to as ‘treatment’ sample) consists of 329 breached 
firms. 
In order to minimise potential changes in external monitoring due to firm’s characteristics other 
than cyber-security incidents, we employ propensity score matching (PSM) in all our analyses 
as implemented by Lawrence et al. (2018). First, we estimate the probability of a firm becoming 
a breach target (Equation 7). We then match each breached firm (treatment) with a non-
breached firm (control sample) within the same industry and with closest probability of being 
breached in the fiscal year of a cyber-security incident (with no replacement)10. Our probability 
model follows the model outlined in Lawrence et al. (2018): 
  
 
8 SBNLs require “notification (1) in a timely manner (2) if personally identifiable information has either been lost, or is likely to be acquired, 
by an unauthorised person, (3) and is reasonably considered to com- promise an individual’s personal information” (Romanosky, Telang, and 
Acquisti, 2011, p. 257). Since 2002, when the first SBNL was enacted California, 47 states Forty-seven states, the District of Columbia, Guam, 
Puerto Rico and the Virgin Islands have enacted their own SNBLs (NCSL, 2017).  
9 This is a standard practice in quantitative accounting studies as financial companies have different reporting requirements and the structure 
of their financial statement is difficult to compare with the one of non-financial firms (Fama and French, 1992; Dechow, Hutton, Kim and 
Sloan, 2012). The reported financial statements for banks, for example, are somewhat different from most companies as there are no accounts 
receivables or inventory to gauge whether sales are rising or falling (Francis and Wang, 2008). Also, as Gore, Pope, and Singh (2001, p. 15) 
pointed out, “the accrual generating process in financial firms is fundamentally different from that in industrial and commercial firms”. 
10 Rosati et al. (2019b) adopts a more restrictive matching condition i.e. a maximum distance of three percent in the estimated score between 
breached and the corresponding matched firm. Even though such restrictive condition ensures more similarity between matched firms, it also 
causes a significant reduction in sample size. In order to preserve the size of our sample we opt for a Nearest-Neighbour approach. We also 
repeated our analyses using the more restrictive matching condition implemented in Rosati et al. (2019b) which reduced our breached sample 
to 248. Our main conclusions were unaltered.	
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(7) 
BREACH is an indicator variable equal to 1 if a firm experiences a cyber-security incident in 
year t, and 0 otherwise. SIZE is the natural logarithm of the firm’s market capitalisation at the 
fiscal-year end. AGE is the natural logarithm of 1 plus the number of years the firm is listed on 
Compustat. ROA is the return on assets, calculated as net income in the fiscal year scaled by 
total assets. SEGMENTS is the natural logarithm of 1 plus the number of operating and 
geographic segments at the fiscal year-end. ACQUISITIONS is the aggregate dollar value of 
acquisitions in the previous fiscal year (t-1) scaled by market capitalisation at the end of the 
current fiscal year (t). SPECIALIST is an indicator variable equal to 1 if the firm’s auditor has 
the highest market share in the client’s industry, measured using audit fees in fiscal year t, and 
0 otherwise. We retrieve accounting information from the Compustat Fundamentals Annual 
file, and audit and restatement data from Audit Analytics. Following Blankley et al. (2012), we 
eliminate from these original files (i.e. pre-matching) (i) firms that failed to issue an internal 
control opinion, (ii) foreign filers since they were not required to issue an internal control 
opinion prior to July 2007, and (iii) restatements caused by clerical errors. 
Table 1 provides a summary of the sample construction (Panel A) and the frequency of cyber-
security incidents by year (Panel B). 
Insert Table 1 here 
4. Results and Discussion 
4.1 Descriptive Statistics 
Table 2 provides the descriptive statistics for the variables used in our analysis and the t-tests 
on differences between breached and non-breached firms. The results show some interesting 
insights in relation to the dependent variables of our regression models. Breached firms in our 
sample are more likely to receive SEC Comment Letters than non-breached firms. This may 
suggest that breached firms are subject to stricter regulator monitoring than non-breached 
firms. However, this relationship is not confirmed by other variables as no significant 
difference between breached and non-breached firms emerges in relation to abnormal accruals, 
the likelihood of reporting small profits or small income increases, the likelihood of receiving 
a going concern report, or to issue a restatement. 
Our results further suggest that breached firms tend to have higher risk of default 
(HIGHBANKRUPTCY), to be more diversified (BUS_SEG), to rely more on external financing 
(FIN) and to have higher earnings to price ratios (EPR), to take shorter time to report financial 
results (REPORT_LAG), and finally to have more liquid assets (CASH) than non-breached 
firms. Further, breached firms tend to pay higher abnormal audit fees (ABAFEES), which also 
suggests they may be subject to stricter auditor monitoring (Blankley et al., 2012). We observe 
no significant difference in the size and other important firm-level controls, suggesting that our 
matching procedure effectively addressed the heterogeneity between breached and non-
breached firms. We also performed a correlation analysis in order to verify whether there was 
a risk of multicollinearity between the control variables included in our regression models. The 
correlation coefficients are reported in Appendix C. These are consistent with previous studies 
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and do not show presence of any strong correlation11 which might lead to multicollinearity. 
Insert Table 2 here 
4.2 Accruals quality 
Table 3 presents the results of the regression model presented in Equation (3). The dependent 
variable in Panel A (ABS_ACC_JM) is the absolute value of abnormal accruals estimated using 
the Modified Jones Model (Dechow et al., 1995). The dependent variable in Panel B 
(ABS_ACC_DD) is the absolute value of abnormal accruals estimated using the Dichow-
Dichev Model (Dichow and Dichev, 2002). An increase in abnormal accruals is typically 
associated with lower audit monitoring and therefore lower audit quality. The main variables 
of interest for our analysis are BREACHED, POST and the DID estimator BREACHED x POST. 
The coefficient of BREACHED is positive but not significant suggesting that there is no 
significant difference between breached and non-breached firms in terms of abnormal accruals 
before the breach. Similar conclusions can be drawn for POST which suggest that no difference 
emerges in the full sample between pre- and post-incident periods. The coefficient of the DID 
estimator BREACHED x POST is negative and significant suggesting that, ceteris paribus, 
breached firms experience a decrease in abnormal accruals following a cyber-security incident 
compared to non-breached firms. These results are consistent with our hypothesis that breached 
firms are subject to stricter auditor monitoring following a cyber-security incident. The results 
are consistent across different accruals models (Panel A and B).  
Other results suggest that firms with higher sales growth rate (SALESGROWTH) and financial 
leverage (LEV) tend to report larger abnormal accruals, while firms with larger assets (LTA), 
and firms with larger cash flows (CFO) or reporting losses (LOSS) tend to report lower 
abnormal accruals. These results are largely consistent with previous studies (e.g. Francis and 
Yu, 2009). 
The DID design relies on the assumption that the trend in the outcome variables for both the 
treatment and control groups in the pre-event period should be similar; this is also called 
parallel trend assumption. Following Tang, Mo, and Chan (2017), we tested the parallel trend 
assumption in two ways. First, we plot the distributions of abnormal accruals for treatment and 
control firms between the two periods using Kernel density. The plots show that the 
distributions are similar pre-incident. Second, we performed a Kolmogorov-Smirnov test, a 
non-parametric test for the equality of distributions. The test suggests that there is no significant 
difference in the distributions of the abnormal accruals pre-incident (p-value=0.526 for Panel 
A and p-value=0.911 for Panel B), and hence the parallel trend assumption is not violated . 
Insert Table 3 here 
4.3 Earnings benchmark 
Table 4 reports the results of the regression model presented in Equation (4). The dependent 
variable in Panel A (SMALL_PROFIT) is an indicator variable equal to 1 if a firm reported a 
net income deflated by lagged total assets between 0 and 5 percent; the dependent variable in 
Panel B (SMALL_INCREASE) is an indicator variable equal to 1 if a firm reported a change in 
net income deflated by lagged total assets is between 0 and 1.3 percent (Francis and Yu, 2009). 
A lower probability of reporting small profits or small earnings increases is typically associated 
 
11 A Pearson correlation coefficient higher than 0.6 denotes a strong correlation which might bias the estimation of the regression coefficients 
(see Gujarati 2003, Ch. 10 for further discussion). 
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with higher earnings quality and therefore with higher audit quality and stricter audit 
monitoring. In line with the results discussed in Section 4.2, the coefficients of BREACHED 
and POST are not statistically significant. This suggests that no significant difference exists 
between breached and non-breached firms during the full sample period, or between pre- and 
post-incident periods for the full sample. The coefficient BREACHED x POST is negative and 
significant in both panels suggesting that breached firms have a lower probability of reporting 
small profits or small earnings increases after a cyber-security incident compared to non-
breached firms. On the basis of the marginal effects associated with the regression coefficients, 
breached firms have a 2.70 percent lower probability of reporting small profits and a 2.90 
percent lower probability of reporting small earnings increases than non-breached firms after 
an incident. These results are consistent with our hypothesis that breached firms are subject to 
stricter auditor monitoring following a cyber-security incident and are robust to a range of 
different proxies for earnings benchmarks. Also, the Kolmogorov-Smirnov test suggests that 
the parallel trend assumption is valid (p-value=0.899 for Panel A and p-value=0.992 for Panel 
B in Table 4).  
Other results presented in Table 4 suggest that larger firms, firms with higher cash flow 
volatility (CFO_VOL) and with lower probability of default (BANKRUPTCY), or firms 
reporting losses (LOSS) are, ceteris paribus, less likely to constantly meet their earnings 
benchmarks. On the contrary, firms with internal control weaknesses (MATWEAK) are more 
likely to constantly meet those benchmarks.  
Insert Table 4 here 
4.4 Going concern opinion 
Table 5 reports the results of the regression model presented in Equation (5). In this model, the 
dependent variable (GCONCERN) is an indicator variable equal to 1 if a firm received a going-
concern audit report, and 0 otherwise. The coefficients of BREACHED and POST are once 
again not statistically significant suggesting that breached and non-breached firms have a 
similar probability of receiving a going-concern report over the sample period and that such 
probability does not change significantly for the full sample in the post-incident period. 
However, the coefficient of BREACHED x POST is positive and statistically significant 
suggesting that breached firms have a 2.6612 percent higher probability of receiving a going-
concern opinion following a cyber-security incident compared to non-breached firms. As 
higher audit quality is assumed to be positively correlated with the probability of a client 
receiving a going-concern report, this result is consistent with our hypothesis that breached 
firms are subject to stricter auditor monitoring following a cyber-security incident. The 
Kolmogorov-Smirnov test suggests that the parallel trend assumption is valid (p-value=0.999). 
Other results suggest that, ceteris paribus, more diversified (GEO_SEG and BUS_SEG) and 
larger firms (LTA), and firms with more liquid assets (CASH) are less likely to receive a going-
concern report, while firms that have received a going-concern report in the past 
(PRIOR_GCONCERN), are also more likely to receive another report. 
Insert Table 5 here 
4.4 Restatements 
Table 6 reports the results of the regression model presented in Equation (6). The dependent 
 
12 This is based on the marginal effect associated with the regression coefficient. 
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variable (RESTATE) is an indicator variable equal to 1 if a firm discloses a restatement within 
the following two years and 0 otherwise. The coefficients of BREACHED and POST are both 
positive but non-significant, while the coefficient of the DID estimator (BREACHED x POST) 
is negative and significant. These results suggest that a negative and significant difference 
emerges between breached and non-breached firms following a cyber-security incident. Based 
on the corresponding marginal effects, ceteris paribus, breached firms have a 8.44 percent 
lower probability of a restatement than non-breached firms following an incident. The 
differences to the results reported in Lawrence et al. (2018) may be due to a number of reasons. 
Firstly, Lawrence et al. (2018) include the year of the breach in their analysis. As discussed in 
Section 3.1, the breach year represents an exceptional year both for the client and the auditor 
and may affect the results of the regression analysis. Secondly, their modelling approach differs 
from ours as they use a panel model with year and industry fixed-effects. As such, their 
empirical setup does not account for differences in breached or non-breached firms. Thirdly, 
systematic differences in the size of breached and non-breached firms are not well captured in 
the panel model presented by Lawrence et al. (2018); recent evidence suggests that firm size 
indicators are significantly related to a firm’s probability of being breached (Kamiya et al., 
2020). 
As higher audit quality is associated with a lower probability of restatement (Blankley et al., 
2012), our results provide further evidence that breached firms are subject to stricter auditor 
monitoring following a cyber-security incident. The Kolmogorov-Smirnov test suggests that 
the parallel trend assumption is valid (p-value=0.983) for our research design. 
Other coefficients suggest that the probability of future restatements is higher for firms with 
ineffective internal controls (MATWEAK), while it is lower for larger firms (LTA) and firms 
with larger earnings-to-price ratio (EPR). These results are consistent with Blankley et al. 
(2012) and provide further evidence of the negative impact of poor internal controls on 
financial reporting quality (Klamm and Watson, 2009; Blankley et al., 2012; Klamm, 
Kobelsky, and Watson, 2012). 
Insert Table 6 here 
4.5 Additional analysis: SEC comment letters 
Our results provide evidence that breached firms experience an increase in audit quality in the 
two years after a cyber-security incident. An increase in audit quality is typically associated 
with an increase in audit effort, ultimately resulting in lower audit risk (Caramanis and Lennox, 
2007). However, given the special attention regulators attribute to cyber-security, breached 
firms are likely to be closely monitored. Increased regulatory scrutiny likely extends to the 
activities of the external auditors as they are responsible for testing the internal controls of their 
clients. Previous studies suggest that auditors are likely to increase their effort when their 
clients are subject to higher regulatory scrutiny (e.g. Donohe and Knechel, 2012; Bell et al., 
2015). We hypothesise a similar dynamic in the context of cyber-security incidents. Therefore, 
we extend our analysis and examine whether breached firms are subject to higher regulatory 
scrutiny, measured as the probability of receiving an SEC Comment Letter (Cassell et al., 
2013). 
Following the Sarbanes-Oxley Act (SOX) of 2002, the Division of Corporation Finance at the 
SEC must review all issuers at least once every three years. Comment Letters represent the 
primary regulatory instrument for the SEC to request additional information about items in the 
financial statements, disclosure practices and internal controls (Gietzmann and Pettinicchio, 
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2014; Johnstone and Petacchi, 2017). While SEC Comment Letters predominantly relate to 
annual and quarterly financial reports, material news disclosures, proxy statements, and 
registration and prospectus filings (Dechow, Lawrence, and Ryans, 2015), they can also cover 
topics like risk factor disclosure and information security (Rosati et al., 2019b).  
We retrieve SEC Comment Letters from Audit Analytics and consider both: (i) the probability 
of receiving a general SEC comment letter (i.e. regardless the topic of the enquiry), and (ii) the 
probability of receiving an SEC Comment Letter specifically focused on IT-related issues13. 
The assumption here is that if breached firms attract higher regulatory scrutiny, they should 
have a higher probability of receiving a Comment Letter. Following Cassell et al. (2013)14 and 
the staggered DID approach adopted for the other models (Rosati et al., 2019b), we test this 
assumption using a probit model with clustered robust standard errors to correct for 
heteroscedasticity and serial dependence (Rogers 1993): 
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CL is an indicator variable equal to 1 if a firm receives an SEC Comment Letter within the 
following two years and 0 otherwise15. Similar to our main regression models, BREACHED, 
POST, and BREACHED x POST are the variables of interest. The model includes a number of 
control variables: (i) material weaknesses (MATWEAK) since firms disclosing material 
weaknesses are subject to higher monitoring than firms with effective internal controls (Doyle 
et al., 2007a; Johnston and Petacchi, 2017); (ii) firm size (LTA) since larger firms receive more 
attention from auditors and regulators than smaller firms and therefore are more likely to 
receive a comment letter (Fernando, Abdel-Meguid, and Elder, 2010; Cassell et al., 2013); (iii) 
firm’s profitability (LOSS) since previous studies suggest that less profitable firms have lower 
financial reporting quality and therefore might be subject to higher scrutiny from regulators 
(Walker and Casterella, 2000; Cassell et al., 2013); (iv) financial distress 
(HIGHBANKRUPTCY) since distressed firms are more likely to be subject to additional 
monitoring than non-distressed firms (Cassell et al., 2013); and (v)  firm’s complexity 
(SALEGROWTH and BUS_SEG) since more complex firms are more difficult to audit (Cassell 
et al., 2013). 
The results are reported in Table 7. The probability of receiving an SEC Comment Letter (CL) 
is the dependent variable in Panel A, while the probability of receiving an IT-related SEC 
Comment Letter (CL_IT) is the dependent variable in Panel B.  
In Panel A, the coefficient of BREACHED and POST are non-significant while the coefficient 
 
13 The topics in the Comment Letters were identified on the basis of a proprietary taxonomy implemented in Audit Analytics. We define IT-
related Comment Letters as those letters covering the topic ‘Data Protection and Security Breach’ as classified by Audit Analytics (Rosati et 
al., 2019b). 
14 Cassell et al. (2013) adopt a logistic regression to test their hypothesis. As an additional test, we performed the same analysis using a logistic 
regression and results are consistent. 
15 Our approach is similar to the one adopted by Cassell et al. (2013) who measure the variables that represent specific events or changes over 
a three-year window. This is justified by the fact that the SEC is required to review the 10-K filing of each registrant at least once every three 
years (see Section 408 paragraph (c) of the Sarbanes-Oxley Act). The SEC then issues a Comment Letter when a filing is found to be materially 
deficient or when further clarifications are needed. While Cassell et al. (2013) focus on the extent of the comments received and the cost 
associated with Comment Letters, and therefore consider the events occurred in the previous three years which may have put the firm under 
the SEC spotlight, we consider a cyber-security incident as one of those events because it may signal potential internal control weaknesses 
and therefore attract higher regulatory scrutiny. In other words a cyber-security incident in year t may trigger a Comment Letter in year  t+1 
or t+2. 
	 19 
BREACHED x POST is positive and significant. This suggests that breached firms have a 10 
percent higher probability of receiving an SEC Comment Letter than non-breached firms after 
experiencing a cyber-security incident. The results in Panel B are mostly consistent as the 
coefficients of BREACHED and POST are negative and non-significant while the coefficient 
of BREACHED x POST is positive and significant. Our results suggest that breached firms are 
more likely to receive this type of Comment Letters following a cyber-security incident. 
Specifically, the probability is 9.2 percent higher for breached firms when compared to non-
breached firms. The results of this additional analysis provide evidence supporting a general 
increase in regulatory scrutiny following cyber-security incidents. Interestingly, the results are 
stronger (although marginally) for general Comment Letters than for IT-related Comment 
Letters. This indicates that the SEC tends to question auditors and managers about their 
financial reporting rather than their IT-related practices. Overall, the results of our analyses 
suggest that the increase in audit quality in breached firms may partly derive from  an increase 
in audit risk and regulatory scrutiny.  
Insert Table 7 here 
5. Robustness Tests 
Although we adopt a variety of audit quality proxies throughout our analysis, we perform a 
number of additional robustness tests. First, we introduce IT-related control weaknesses as an 
additional control in all our models. IT-related control weaknesses have been found to be 
positively related to misstatements (Klamm and Watson, 2009) and, as such, may increase 
cyber-security risk (Klamm and Watson, 2009; Cereola and Cereola, 2011). We also re-run our 
analysis and exclude our proxy for internal control weakness to avoid potential 
multicollinearity. In both cases the results are consistent with those presented in previous 
sections. Second, we test our models using a different specification of RESTATE and CL. 
Specifically, we test restatements and Comment Letters announced within one year instead of 
within two years as suggested by Lawrence et al. (2018). Our conclusions remain unchanged. 
Thirdly, we run our analysis on the subsample of events that occurred after the release of the 
first SEC disclosure guidance on cyber-security in 2011 (SEC, 2011). While the long time 
period allows us to work with a larger sample, more recent events may generate different 
outcomes than events that lie further in the past (Gordon et al., 2011). The results and 
conclusions based on a subsample of breaches since 2011 are consistent with those discussed 
in the main analysis. Fourthly, we also test whether the results of our analyses depend on the 
length of the time period considered. To address these concerns, we run the same analyses 
considering three and four years16 before and after an incident and the results are consistent. 
Finally, in order to further validate our results, we also carried out personal interviews with 
five senior IT auditors from the Big 4 audit firms17 who confirmed that they revise their audit 
plan following a cyber-security incident, and that they pay extra attention to breached clients 
in the years following a cyber-security incident. Finally, the interviewees also clarified that the 
revision of the audit plan tends to be incremental rather than radical. Additional testing, indeed, 
is mainly focused on the weaknesses highlighted by incidents; this usually allows auditors to 
collect additional valuable audit evidence leading to higher audit quality. 
6. Summary and Conclusion 
 
16 We limit the number of years pre- and post-incident as the longer the time period the higher the likelihood of a firm experiencing another 
breach. 
17 One from Ernst&Young, KPMG and PricewaterhouseCoopers, and two from Deloitte. 
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Based on a sample of publicly listed US firms, this study demonstrates that cyber-security 
incidents do not result in an observable deterioration in audit quality. We document consistent 
positive shifts in four commonly used audit quality proxies. This is an important finding which 
supports the view that, despite being a significant risk factor, cyber-security breaches do not 
result in financial reporting deficiencies. We understand our findings as the result of the 
documented increase in audit effort in Li et al. (2016) and Rosati et al. (2019b). In respect to a 
possible channel of transmission, we show that breached firms are subject to higher regulatory 
scrutiny than non-breached firms. Therefore, regulatory scrutiny, as a side effect of cyber-
security incident, may partially explain the observed increase in audit quality. 
The documented results may be of relevance and interest for managers, auditors and policy 
makers. Managers may benefit from a better understanding of the potential consequences of 
cyber-security incidents beyond mere direct and tangible costs like fines, loss in revenues etc. 
Auditors may be interested in the results of this study as an external assessment of the 
effectiveness of their practices in response to cyber-security incidents. Finally, our study also 
has policy implications. It shows that auditors are able to sufficiently address and respond to 
cyber-security risks even in the absence of specific disclosure requirements18 from regulators. 
Our study is also subject to a number of limitations which may represent avenues for future 
research. First, our sample of data breaches is not exhaustive. It covers only a sample of 
publicly listed US firms. The fact that cyber-security incidents at large US firms do not lead to 
an observable deterioration in audit quality cannot easily be generalised. While large US firms 
may have a higher likelihood of becoming a breach target in the first place, they also have 
readily available resources to deal with the consequences of a breach. Similarly, we only focus 
on Big 4 auditors. The Big 4 may have more expertise in dealing with cyber-risk than non-Big 
4 auditors (DeAngelo, 1981, Haislip et al., 2016). An analysis of non-Big 4 auditors and their 
ability to address cyber-security incidents may lead to substantially different results and 
conclusions. Second, we do not address whether the type and the extent of a cyber-security 
incident influences the auditor and regulator’s response. Previous studies in the information 
management literature find that incident characteristics, such as breach type or the type of data 
stolen, result in different market reactions and costs (Campbell et al., 2003; Cavusoglu et al., 
2004; Gatzlaff and McCullough, 2010; Gordon, Loeb, and Sohail, 2010; Rosati et al., 2019a). 
Auditors may also perceive some incidents as less severe than others and therefore adjust their 
audit effort accordingly. An in-depth analysis of the characteristics of a breach may help 
address this point. Third, due to technological innovation, outsourcing information systems and 
the adoption of cloud computing has increased over the last decade (Han and Mithas, 2013; 
Rosati and Lynn, 2016). Both outsourcing and cloud computing represent a significant 
challenge for auditors, particularly because of an increase in potential material weaknesses 
(Klamm et al., 2012) or the risk of failure in financial reporting due to the provider’s errors 
(Anderson, Christ, Dekker, and Sedatole, 2014). Qualitative and quantitative research may 
provide useful insights in respect to auditors’ perception of these recent trends. Given that the 
literature on the relationship between cyber-security and audit risk is at an early stage, this 
paper provides the foundation for future research in this field. Finally, aggregated data from 
Audit Analytics does not allow us to disentangle the effect of audit risk and regulatory 
monitoring as potential triggers of increased audit effort. Future studies leveraging more in-
depth information about auditors’ activities may shed light on this matter and provide further 
insights concerning auditors’ proactiveness or reactiveness to cyber-security incidents. 
 
18 The Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC) issued guidelines on the disclosure of cyber-risk in 2011 (SEC 2011). However, specific 
regulatory requirements for cyber-security risk disclosure were only enacted on 26 February 2018 (SEC 2018). 
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Sample Composition 
    
Panel A: Sampling process    
    
Cyber Security Incidents Firms   
    
Events reported by Privacy Rights 
Clearinghouse (2005–2014) 4,041   
Non-publicly traded firms (3,619)   
Financial Companies (83)   
Non-Big 4 (10)   
Final sample (Treatment) 329   
    
Financial and Audit Information    
Compustat Fundamental Annual 13,455   
Financial Companies (1,998)   
Audit Analytics Restatement File 5,833   
Missing Data (1,069)   
Remaining 4,764   
Final Sample (Control) 329   
    
Panel B: Cyber-security incidents by year   
    
Year No. of breaches  Percentage 
    
2005 18  5.47 
2006 47  14.29 
2007 34  10.33 
2008 23  6.99 
2009 23  6.99 
2010 36  10.94 
2011 42  12.77 
2012 39  11.85 
2013 42  12.77 
2014 25  7.60 
    
Total 329  100.00 
     
This table summarises the sampling process (Panel A) and reports the number of 





Descriptive Statistics and Tests of Differences 
Variable  Overall  Breached  Non-Breached  Diff.  t-statistic  p-value 
CL  0.506  0.539  0.480  0.059  2.78  0.005 *** 
CL_IT  0.012  0.014  0.011  0.002  0.57  0.570  
ABS_ACC_JM  0.774  0.786  0.762  0.024  0.11  0.913  
ABS_ACC_DD  0.868  0.831  0.903  -0.072  -0.41  0.684  
SMALL_PROFIT  0.279  0.265  0.291  -0.026  -1.34  0.179  
SMALL_INCREASE  0.244  0.241  0.246  -0.005  -0.29  0.767  
GCONCERN  0.004  0.005  0.004  0.001  0.33  0.735  
PRIOR_GCONCERN  0.005  0.004  0.005  -0.001  -0.42  0.676  
RESTATE  0.103  0.104  0.102  -0.002  -0.18  0.858  
LAF  15.849  15.869  15.833  0.037  0.66  0.506  
ABAFEES  0.200  0.279  0.127  0.153  4.77  0.000 *** 
LTA  16.468  16.452  16.482  -0.030  -0.69  0.509  
LEV  0.206  0.214  0.200  0.014  1.28  0.199  
LOSS  0.153  0.159  0.147  0.009  0.62  0.532  
LAG_LOSS  0.139  0.146  0.132  0.014  0.85  0.396  
BANKRUPTCY  2.893  2.899  2.887  0.012  0.04  0.965  
HIGHBANKRUPTCY  0.028  0.039  0.020  0.019  2.65  0.008 *** 
SALESGROWTH  1.095  1.086  1.101  -0.015  -0.94  0.344  
SALESGROWTH_VOL  0.568  0.615  0.520  0.095  1.39  0.165  
BUS_SEG  0.648  0.686  0.617  0.068  2.14  0.032 ** 
GEO_SEG  1.568  1.560  1.575  -0.015  -0.71  0.475  
MTB  3.300  4.267  2.289  1.979  1.64  0.101  
FIN  0.115  0.126  0.107  0.019  1.79  0.073 * 
EPSGROW  0.518  0.530  0.508  0.021  1.03  0.302  
EPR  0.000  0.000  0.000  0.000  3.28  0.001 *** 
CFO  0.056  0.058  0.054  0.003  1.03  0.302  
CFO_VOL  0.037  0.036  0.038  0.002  -0.99  0.921  
MATWEAK  0.034  0.034  0.035  -0.001  -0.09  0.921  
REPORT_LAG  102.512  96.259  107.568  -11.308  -3.95  0.000 *** 
CASH  0.162  0.179  0.150  0.029  2.95  0.003 *** 
This table reports the descriptive statistics of the variables adopted in the empirical analysis and t-test on the differences between breached and non-breached firms. 
All the variables are defined in Appendix A. P-values denote the level of significance of t-Tests under the null hypothesis of equal means in the subsamples of breached and 




Regression Results: Audit Quality – Earnings Management 
               
  Panel A: Modified Jones Model  Panel B: Dechow-Dichev Model 
               
Variable  Coeff.  t-statistic  p-value  Coeff.  t-statistic  p-value 
               
INTERCEPT  3.191  1.65  0.098 *  5.840  3.91  0.000 *** 
BREACHED  0.145  0.82  0.415   0.046  0.16  0.873  
POST  0.028  0.64  0.520   0.132  0.95  0.343  
BREACHED x POST  -0.168  -3.54  0.000 ***  -0.124  -4.28  0.000 *** 
BUS_SEG  0.018  0.09  0.928   0.018  0.12  0.906  
GEO_SEG  0.003  0.70  0.453   0.007  0.12  0.907  
LTA  -0.002  -1.96  0.050 **  -0.003  -4.23  0.000 *** 
SALESGROWTH  0.043  2.68  0.008 ***  0.030  2.62  0.009 *** 
SALESGROWTH_VOL  0.000  0.50  0.617   0.000  2.16  0.031 ** 
CFO  -0.102  -1.80  0.072 *  -0.237  -0.25  0.800  
CFO_VOL  0.013  0.29  0.773   0.027  0.84  0.404  
MATWEAK  0.196  2.32  0.021 **  0.157  1.20  0.230  
LEV  0.048  1.66  0.097 *  0.015  2.94  0.003 *** 
LOSS  -0.037  -2.02  0.045 **  -0.067  -1.91  0.057 * 
BANKRUPTCY  0.018  0.53  0.599   0.014  0.17  0.867  
MTB  0.000  0.06  0.951   0.003  0.81  0.421  
Industry fixed-effect  Yes  Yes 
Year fixed-effect  Yes  Yes 
F-Stat  6.07  6.67 
p-value  0.000  0.000 
Adjusted R-squared  0.23  0.25 
N  2,632  2,632 
     
This table reports the results of the OLS regression analysis for the model presented in Equation (3). Regression coefficients are estimated using Newey-West robust standard 
errors to correct for heteroscedasticity and first-order autocorrelation. The dependent variable in Panel A (Panel B) is the absolute value of abnormal accruals estimated using 
the Modified Jones Model (Dehow-Dichev Model). All other variables are described in Appendix A. Kolmogorov-Smirnov test: p-value=0.526 for Panel A; p-value=0.911 




Regression Results: Audit Quality – Earnings Benchmark 
               
  Panel A: Small Profit  Panel B: Small Increase in Earnings 
               
Variable  Coeff.  z-statistic  p-value  Coeff.  z-statistic  p-value 
               
INTERCEPT  1.334  1.54  0.124   1.492  2.52  0.012 ** 
BREACHED  0.058  0.60  0.545   0.004  0.05  0.958  
POST  0.027  0.21  0.832   0.188  1.12  0.264  
BREACHED x POST  -0.024  -1.75  0.080 *  -0.018  -2.60  0.009 *** 
BUS_SEG  0.005  0.08  0.935   0.050  0.82  0.410  
GEO_SEG  0.009  1.59  0.113   0.011  1.20  0.230  
LTA  -0.002  -0.54  0.588   -0.006  -1.97  0.049 ** 
SALESGROWTH  0.039  0.93  0.354   0.021  1.02  0.306  
SALESGROWTH_VOL  0.000  0.59  0.558   0.000  0.17  0.864  
CFO  -0.048  -5.14  0.000 ***  -0.066  -0.26  0.794  
CFO_VOL  -0.035  -1.74  0.082 *  -0.049  -1.85  0.065 * 
MATWEAK  0.020  1.63  0.091 *  0.085  2.41  0.016 *** 
LEV  0.043  0.38  0.704   0.054  2.50  0.012 *** 
LOSS  -1.011  -4.52  0.000 ***  -0.823  -4.23  0.000 *** 
BANKRUPTCY  -0.101  -2.70  0.007 ***  -0.035  -3.19  0.001 *** 
MTB  0.003  1.92  0.055 *  0.000  0.31  0.759  
Industry fixed-effect  Yes  Yes 
Year fixed-effect  Yes  Yes 
Chi-Squared  86.98  106.47 
p-value  0.000  0.000 
Pseudo R-squared  0.29  0.30 
N  2,632  2,632 
     
This table reports the results of the probit regression analysis for the model presented in Equation (4). Regression coefficients are estimated using the robust cluster technique 
to correct for heteroscedasticity and serial dependence. SMALL_PROFIT (SMALL_INCREASE) is the dependent variable in Panel A (Panel B) and  it is equal to 1 if a firm 
reported a net income deflated by lagged total assets (a change in net income deflated by lagged total assets) between 0 and 5 (1.3) percent (Francis and Yu, 2009). All other 
variables are described in Appendix A.  Kolmogorov-Smirnov test: p-value=0.899 for Panel A; p-value=0.992 for Panel B. *, **, *** denote significance at 10, 5 and 1 






Regression Results: Audit Quality – Going-Concern Report 
        
Variable  Coeff.  z-statistic  p-value 
        
INTERCEPT  -3.195  -1.24  0.214 *** 
BREACHED  -0.521  -1.08  0.282  
POST  -0.374  -0.72  0.471  
BREACHED x POST  0.682  2.87  0.005 *** 
BUS_SEG  -0.133  -2.42  0.016 ** 
GEO_SEG  -0.145  -2.05  0.040 ** 
LTA  -0.067  -4.14  0.000 *** 
CASH  -0.844  -1.64  0.101 * 
PRIOR_GCONCERN  1.760  3.59  0.000 *** 
REPORT_LAG  0.001  0.23  0.820  
LEV  -0.172  -0.93  0.351  
LOSS  0.302  0.48  0.629  
LAG_LOSS  1.076  2.89  0.004 *** 
BANKRUPTCY  -0.004  -0.33  0.742  
MTB  0.012  1.25  0.212  
Industry fixed-effect  Yes 
Year fixed-effect  Yes 
Chi-Squared  91.14 
p-value  0.000 
Pseudo R-squared  0.35 
N  2,632 
   
This table reports the results of the probit regression analysis for the model presented in Equation (5). Regression coefficients are estimated using the robust cluster technique 
to correct for heteroscedasticity and serial dependence. The dependent variable (GCONCERN) is equal to 1 if a firm receives a going-concern audit report and 0 otherwise. 





Regression Results: Audit Quality – Restatement 
        
Dependent Variable: Restatement 
        
Variable  Coeff.  z-statistic  p-value 
        
INTERCEPT  -0.798  -1.32  0.188  
BREACHED  0.305  0.34  0.733  
POST  0.315  0.84  0.404  
BREACHED x POST  -0.518  -2.14  0.032 ** 
LTA  -0.055  -1.64  0.100 * 
LEV  0.184  1.25  0.211  
MTB  -0.002  -0.54  0.588  
FIN  -0.027  -0.15  0.883  
EPSGROW  -0.108  -1.25  0.210  
EPR  -0.114  -4.74  0.000 *** 
CFO  -0.719  -1.13  0.258  
MATWEAK  0.698  2.51  0.012 *** 
ABAFEES  -0.100  1.05  0.294  
Industry fixed-effect  Yes 
Year fixed-effect  Yes 
Chi-Squared  76.70 
p-value  0.000 
Pseudo R-squared  0.27 
N  2,632 
   
This table reports the results of the probit regression analysis for the model presented in Equation (6). Regression coefficients are estimated using the robust cluster technique 
to correct for heteroscedasticity and serial dependence. The dependent variable (RESTATE) is equal to 1 if a firm discloses a restatement within the following two years and 
0 otherwise (Blankely et al., 2012). All other variables are described in Appendix A.  Kolmogorov-Smirnov test: p-value=0.983. *, **, *** denote significance at 10, 5 and 
1 percent levels, respectively. 
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TABLE 7 
Regression Results: SEC Monitoring 
               
  Panel A: SEC Comment Letters  Panel B: SEC Comment Letters (IT) 
               
Variable  Coeff.  z-statistic  p-value  Coeff.  z-statistic  p-value 
               
INTERCEPT  -2.226  -5.95  0.000 ***  -2.950  -7.64  0.000 *** 
BREACHED  0.177  0.28  0.780   -0.424  1.54  0.131  
POST  -0.163  -1.55  0.122   -0.991  0.34  0.733  
BREACHED x POST  0.417  1.85  0.065 *  0.596  2.84  0.005 *** 
MATWEAK  0.239  6.49  0.000 ***  0.277  2.92  0.003 *** 
LTA  0.167  8.88  0.000 ***  0.229  4.83  0.000 *** 
LOSS  0.041  0.41  0.684   0.057  1.27  0.204  
HIGHBANKRUPTCY  0.138  0.61  0.542   0.253  0.87  0.387  
SALEGROWTH  0.334  2.67  0.008 ***  0.163  2.21  0.027 ** 
BUS_SEG  0.253  0.50  0.618   0.262  2.11  0.035 ** 
Industry fixed-effect  Yes  Yes 
Year fixed-effect  Yes  Yes 
Chi-Squared  84.01  82.73 
p-value  0.000  0.000 
Pseudo R-squared  0.38  0.35 
N  2,632  2,632 
     
This table reports the results of the probit regression analysis for the model presented in Equation (7). Regression coefficients are estimated using the robust cluster technique 
to correct for heteroscedasticity and serial dependence. The dependent variable in Panel A (Panel B) is equal to 1 if a firm receives an SEC Comment Letter (IT-related 
SEC Comment Letter) within the following two years, 0 otherwise. All other variables are described in Appendix A. Kolmogorov-Smirnov test: p-value= 0.632 for Panel 
A; p-value= 0.973 for Panel B. *, **, *** denote significance at 10, 5 and 1 percent levels, respectively. 
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Total accruals estimated as the change in non-cash 
current assets minus the change in current liabilities 
(excl. the current portion of long-term debt), minus 
depreciation and amortization, scaled by lagged total 




Absolute value of abnormal accruals estimated using 




Absolute value of abnormal accruals estimated using 





Indicator variable equal to 1 if a firm reported a net 
income, deflated by lagged total assets, between 0 and 5 




Indicator variable equal to 1 if a change in net income, 
deflated by lagged total assets, lies between 0 and 1.3 




Indicator variable equal to 1 if a firm receives a going-





Indicator variable equal to 1 if a firm announces a 
restatement within the following two years, 0 otherwise 




Indicator variable equal to 1 if a firm receives an SEC 





Indicator variable equal to 1 if a firm receives an SEC 
Comment Letter on “Data Protection and Security 




Indicator variable equal to 1 if a firm experiences a 
cyber-security incident in year t, and 0 otherwise.  
Privacy Rights 
Clearinghouse 






Indicator variable equal to 1 if a firm belongs to the 
treatment sample i.e. it experienced a cyber-security 





Indicator variable equal to 1 if firm-year belongs to the 




Interaction variable between BREACHED and POST. 




Change in revenues between year t-1 and year t 









Operating income after depreciation (Khotari et al., 
2005)  
Compustat 
LAF  Natural logarithm of audit fees.  Audit Analytics 
ABAFEES 
 





Indicator variable equal to 1 if a firm received a going- 






APPENDIX A (continued from previous page) 
Variable Definitions 
     
Variable  Description  Data Source 
LEV  Total debt divided by total assets.  Compustat 
LOSS 
 
Indicator variable equal to 1 if the income before 




Indicator variable equal to 1 if a firm reported a loss 
in the previous fiscal year, 0 otherwise.  
Compustat 
BANKRUPTCY  Altman (2000) Z-Score.  Compustat 
HIGHBANKRUPTCY 
 
Indicator variable equal to 1 if a firm is assigned to 
the decile having the lowest Altman’s Z-Score, 0 
otherwise.  
Compustat 
SALESGROWTH  One-year growth rate of a firm’s sales revenue.  Compustat 
SALESGROWTH_VOL 
 
Standard deviation of sales revenue for the most 




Number of business segments a firm operates in as 




Number of geographical segments a firm operates in 
as reported in the Compustat segments database.  
Compustat 
MTB  Market-to-book ratio.  Compustat 
FIN 
 
Sum of additional cash raised from issuance of long-
term debt, common stock and preferred stock divided 




Indicator variable equal to 1 if a firm experiences a 
positive earnings change for four consecutive 




Earnings-to-price ratio, defined as income from 
continuing operations scaled by market capitalisation 
at the end of the fiscal year.  
Compustat 
CFO  Cash flow from operations.  Compustat 
CFO_VOL 
 
Standard deviation of cash flows from operations for 




Indicator variable equal to 1 if a firm receives a 
material weakness opinion in the current or in the 





Number of days between the fiscal year-end and the 




Sum of the firm’s cash and investment securities, 
scaled by total assets.  
Compustat 
LTA  Natural logarithm of end of year total assets.  Compustat 
SIZE 
 





Natural logarithm of 1 plus the number of years the 




Return on assets calculated as net income at fiscal 




Natural logarithm of 1 plus the number of operating 




The aggregate dollar value of acquisitions in the fiscal 
year t-1, scaled by market capitalisation at the end of 





APPENDIX A (continued from previous page) 
Variable Definitions 
     
Variable  Description  Data Source 
SPECIALIST 
 
Indicator variable equal to 1 if the firm’s auditor has 
the highest audit fees’ market share in the client’s 
industry, 0 otherwise.  
Audit 
Analytics 
Industry Indicators  Industry indicators based on 2-digit SIC Codes.  Compustat 









Regression Results: Audit Fee Model 
        
Variable  Coeff.  t-statistic  p-value 
        
INTERCEPT  6.450  182.34  0.000 *** 
LTA  0.486  237.15  0.000 *** 
CR  0.000  -1.74  0.080 * 
CA_TA  0.453  20.67  0.000 *** 
ARINV  -0.039  -1.65  0.100  
ROA  -0.002  -5.00  0.000 *** 
LOSS  0.153  19.86  0.000 *** 
FOREIGN  0.390  51.81  0.000 *** 
MERGER  0.077  8.85  0.000 *** 
BUSY  -0.081  -10.87  0.000 *** 
LEV  0.001  1.76  0.079 * 
INTANG  0.306  14.34  0.000 *** 
SEG  0.136  28.79  0.000 *** 
MATWEAK  0.373  18.90  0.000 *** 
Industry fixed-effect  Yes 
Year fixed-effect  Yes 
F-statistic  131.32 
p-value  0.000 
R-squared  0.77 
N  44,193 
         
This table reports the results of the regression analysis for the model proposed by Blankley et al. (2012) to 
estimate abnormal audit fees. Regression coefficients are estimated using the robust cluster technique to correct 
for heteroscedasticity and serial dependence. The dependent variable is the natural logarithm of audit fees 
(LAF). All other variables are described in Appendix A. *, **, *** denote significance at 10, 5 and 1 percent 
levels, respectively. 
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APPENDIX C (I) 
Pearson Correlation Coefficients between Variables 
Variable  CL  CL_IT  ABS_ACC_JM  ABS_ACC_DD  SMALL_PROFIT  SMALL_INCREASE  GCONCERN 
CL  1.000                    
CL_IT  0.060 ***  1.000                 
ABS_ACC_JM  -0.023   0.085 ***  1.000              
ABS_ACC_DD  -0.087 ***  0.070 ***  0.908 ***  1.000           
SMALL_PROFIT  -0.072 ***  -0.002   0.033 *  -0.009   1.000        
SMALL_INCREASE  -0.073 ***  0.004   -0.039 **  -0.043 **  0.155 ***  1.000     
GCONCERN  0.015   -0.008   -0.010   -0.010   0.061 ***  -0.040 ***  1.000  
PRIOR_GCONCERN  0.000   -0.008   -0.008   -0.009   0.050 ***  -0.039 **  0.613 *** 
RESTATE  0.019   0.033 **  0.022   0.032 **  -0.004   -0.051 ***  -0.024 * 
LAF  0.051 ***  0.069 ***  -0.076 ***  -0.116 ***  0.154 ***  0.122 ***  -0.014  
ABAFEES  0.021   0.009   -0.024   -0.020   0.077 ***  0.040 **  -0.004  
LTA  0.074 ***  0.067 ***  -0.043 **  -0.087 ***  0.237 ***  0.218 ***  -0.010  
LEV  -0.049 ***  -0.014   0.029 *  0.077 ***  0.076 ***  -0.074 ***  0.034 ** 
LOSS  0.012   -0.035 **  -0.005   -0.031 *  0.328 ***  -0.188 ***  0.107 *** 
LAG_LOSS  -0.009   -0.014   -0.015   -0.046 **  0.256 ***  -0.134 ***  0.092 *** 
BANKRUPTCY  -0.009   -0.005   -0.008   0.018   -0.297 ***  -0.022   -0.096 *** 
HIGHBANKRUPTCY  0.003   -0.005   -0.001   0.003   -0.146 ***  -0.068 ***  -0.011  
SALESGROWTH  0.085 ***  0.001   0.047 **  0.039 **  -0.061 ***  0.011   -0.056 *** 
SALESGROWTH_VOL  0.074 ***  0.060 ***  -0.027   -0.019   -0.039 **  0.029 **  -0.013  
BUS_SEG  -0.027 *  0.018   -0.035 **  -0.060 **  -0.039 **  -0.016   -0.043 *** 
GEO_SEG  -0.016   0.012   -0.103 ***  -0.106 ***  -0.163 ***  -0.112 ***  -0.024 * 
MTB  -0.021   0.015   0.001   0.007   -0.044   0.007   -0.010  
FIN  0.011   -0.027 *  0.008   0.036   -0.012 ***  -0.079 ***  0.016  
EPSGROW  -0.078 ***  0.031 **  -0.003   0.003 *  -0.091 ***  0.461 ***  -0.033 ** 
EPR  -0.014   -0.006   -0.017   -0.023   0.057 ***  0.071 ***  -0.007  
CFO  0.011   0.007   -0.038 **  -0.024   -0.225 ***  -0.034 **  -0.056 *** 
CFO_VOL  0.003   -0.009   0.048 **  0.051 ***  -0.015   -0.058 ***  0.025 * 
MATWEAK  0.014   -0.009   0.038 **  0.014   0.048 ***  -0.050 ***  -0.013  
REPORT_LAG  0.052 ***  0.009   0.005   -0.007   -0.035 **  -0.054 ***  0.001  
CASH  0.028 *  -0.001   0.051 **  0.041 **  -0.070 ***  -0.053 ***  -0.001  
This table reports the Pearson correlation coefficients among variables adopted in the empirical analysis. 
All the variables are defined in Appendix A. *, **, *** denote significance at 10, 5 and 1 percent levels, respectively. 
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APPENDIX C (II) 
Pearson Correlation Coefficients between Variables 
Variable  PRIOR_GCONCERN  RESTATE  LAF  ABAFEES  LTA  LEV  LOSS 
CL                      
CL_IT                      
ABS_ACC_JM                      
ABS_ACC_DD                      
SMALL_PROFIT                      
SMALL_INCREASE                      
GCONCERN                      
PRIOR_GCONCERN  1.000                    
RESTATE  -0.024   1.000                 
LAF  -0.033 **  -0.055 ***  1.000              
ABAFEES  -0.036 **  -0.028 *  0.633 ***  1.000           
LTA  -0.016   -0.091 ***  0.807 ***  0.165 ***  1.000        
LEV  0.050 ***  0.029 **  -0.033 **  0.055 ***  -0.089 ***  1.000     
LOSS  0.121 ***  0.032 **  -0.070 ***  -0.045 ***  -0.140 ***  0.126 ***  1.000  
LAG_LOSS  0.108 ***  0.024   -0.092 ***  -0.024   -0.150 ***  0.127 ***  0.497 *** 
BANKRUPTCY  -0.168 ***  -0.044 **  -0.067 ***  -0.122 ***  0.005   -0.287 ***  -0.248 *** 
HIGHBANKRUPTCY  -0.011   -0.016   -0.123 ***  -0.083 ***  -0.138 ***  -0.113 ***  -0.048 *** 
SALESGROWTH  -0.011   -0.010   -0.089 ***  -0.113 ***  -0.076 ***  0.013   -0.034 ** 
SALESGROWTH_VOL  -0.013   -0.070 ***  0.438 ***  0.004   0.283 ***  -0.081 ***  -0.067 *** 
BUS_SEG  -0.050 ***  -0.004   0.231 ***  0.062 ***  0.065 ***  0.032 **  -0.027 ** 
GEO_SEG  -0.030 **  0.026 *  0.251 ***  0.097 ***  -0.051 ***  0.014   0.014  
MTB  -0.006   -0.011   0.005   0.007   -0.005   -0.001   -0.022  
FIN  0.019   0.038 **  -0.135 **  -0.014   -0.191 ***  0.382 ***  0.079 *** 
EPSGROW  -0.046 ***  -0.072 ***  0.040   0.069 ***  0.009   -0.026 *  -0.204 *** 
EPR  -0.008   0.002   0.002 ***  -0.004   0.046 ***  0.029 *  -0.040 ** 
CFO  -0.060 ***  -0.025   -0.041 ***  -0.011   -0.066 ***  -0.029 **  -0.133 *** 
CFO_VOL  0.027 *  0.034 **  -0.154   -0.119 ***  -0.136 ***  -0.011   0.056 *** 
MATWEAK  -0.013   0.150 ***  0.014   -0.055 ***  -0.021   0.055 ***  0.085 *** 
REPORT_LAG  0.014   -0.005   -0.116 ***  -0.107 ***  -0.104 ***  -0.005   0.092 *** 
CASH  -0.002   0.008   -0.085 ***  -0.115 ***  -0.106 ***  -0.056 ***  0.025 * 
This table reports the Pearson correlation coefficients among variables adopted in the empirical analysis. 




APPENDIX C (III) 
Pearson Correlation Coefficients between Variables 
Variable  LAG_LOSS  BANKRUPTCY  HIGHBANKRUPTCY  SALESGROWTH  SALESGROWTH_VOL  BUS_SEG  GEO_SEG 
CL                      
CL_IT                      
ABS_ACC_JM                      
ABS_ACC_DD                      
SMALL_PROFIT                      
SMALL_INCREASE                      
GCONCERN                      
PRIOR_GCONCERN                      
RESTATE                      
LAF                      
ABAFEES                      
LTA                      
LEV                      
LOSS                      
LAG_LOSS  1.000                    
BANKRUPTCY  -0.243 ***  1.000                 
HIGHBANKRUPTCY  -0.048 ***  0.558 ***  1.000              
SALESGROWTH  0.036 **  -0.082 ***  0.059 ***  1.000           
SALESGROWTH_VOL  -0.069 ***  0.036 **  -0.050 ***  0.008   1.000        
BUS_SEG  -0.028 *  -0.065 ***  -0.056 ***  -0.042 ***  0.093 ***  1.000     
GEO_SEG  0.007   0.076 ***  0.072 ***  -0.027 **  0.082 ***  0.164 ***  1.000  
MTB  -0.019   0.034 *  0.020   0.008   -0.001   0.016   0.001  
FIN  0.045 ***  -0.069 ***  -0.012   0.054 ***  -0.085 ***  -0.026 *  0.017  
EPSGROW  0.098 ***  0.049 **  0.022   0.104 ***  0.014   0.021   0.009  
EPR  -0.042 **  -0.034 *  -0.018   0.009   0.007   -0.034 **  -0.088 *** 
CFO  -0.112 ***  0.285 ***  0.057 ***  -0.016   -0.006   0.003   0.077 *** 
CFO_VOL  0.060 ***  -0.154 ***  0.019   0.164 ***  -0.034 **  -0.037 **  -0.040 *** 
MATWEAK  0.064 ***  -0.035 **  -0.020   0.016   0.018   0.019   0.023  
REPORT_LAG  0.077 ***  -0.019   0.000   0.031 **  0.005 ***  -0.047 ***  -0.024 * 
CASH  0.029 **  0.252 ***  0.097 ***  0.252 ***  -0.020 **  -0.028 *  0.025 * 
This table reports the Pearson correlation coefficients among variables adopted in the empirical analysis. 




APPENDIX C (IV) 
Pearson Correlation Coefficients between Variables 
Variable  MTB  FIN  EPSGROW  EPR  CFO  CFO_VOL  MATWEAK 
CL                      
CL_IT                      
ABS_ACC_JM                      
ABS_ACC_DD                      
SMALL_PROFIT                      
SMALL_INCREASE                      
GCONCERN                      
PRIOR_GCONCERN                      
RESTATE                      
LAF                      
ABAFEES                      
LTA                      
LEV                      
LOSS                      
LAG_LOSS                      
BANKRUPTCY                      
HIGHBANKRUPTCY                      
SALESGROWTH                      
SALESGROWTH_VOL                      
BUS_SEG                      
GEO_SEG                      
MTB  1.000                    
FIN  0.000   1.000                 
EPSGROW  0.022   -0.039 **  1.000              
EPR  -0.005   -0.007   -0.053 ***  1.000           
CFO  0.018   -0.016   0.053 ***  -0.017   1.000        
CFO_VOL  0.002   0.045 ***  -0.020   -0.009   0.289 ***  1.000     
MATWEAK  -0.008   0.049 ***  -0.023 *  0.023   -0.017   -0.002 ***  1.000  
REPORT_LAG  -0.009   0.045 ***  -0.055 ***  -0.016   -0.015   0.039   0.059 *** 
CASH  0.011   0.036 **  -0.004   -0.021   0.791 ***  0.376 ***  -0.002  
This table reports the Pearson correlation coefficients among variables adopted in the empirical analysis. 




APPENDIX C (V) 
Pearson Correlation Coefficients between Variables 
Variable  REPORT_LAG  CASH           
CL                      
CL_IT                      
ABS_ACC_JM                      
ABS_ACC_DD                      
SMALL_PROFIT                      
SMALL_INCREASE                      
GCONCERN                      
PRIOR_GCONCERN                      
RESTATE                      
LAF                      
ABAFEES                      
LTA                      
LEV                      
LOSS                      
LAG_LOSS                      
BANKRUPTCY                      
HIGHBANKRUPTCY                      
SALESGROWTH                      
SALESGROWTH_VOL                      
BUS_SEG                      
GEO_SEG                      
MTB                      
FIN                      
EPSGROW                      
EPR                      
CFO                      
CFO_VOL                      
MATWEAK                      
REPORT_LAG  1.000                    
CASH  0.028 *  1.000                 
This table reports the Pearson correlation coefficients among variables adopted in the empirical analysis. 
All the variables are defined in Appendix A. *, **, *** denote significance at 10, 5 and 1 percent levels, respectively. 
 
